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Statistics is a mathematical discipline that provides advice in the making of
uncertain choices: for instance, if we want to invest in a company, we would
like to see a projection of future prospects before making a decision. There are
various statistical tools that we may use to cope with such uncertain choices. In
this paper we will focus on significance testing, the most widely used statistical
tool for quantitative analysis in science and business. We want to explore in
what sense significance testing can help in making ethical decisions, and in what
sense it may obstruct them.
Statistics is most useful for consequentialist approaches to ethics, where ac-
tions are assessed in terms of their consequences. However, not every statistical
tool allows us to justify our choices in a consequentialist manner. Statistical
tests can either be interpreted behaviorally, as guiding actual decisions that we
make, or evidentially, as providing evidence about the truth or falsehood of a
particular claim. In daily statistical practice, significance tests are often used
for both ends, for inference and decision-making. It is this tension between
the behavioral and the evidential interpretation that stands at the heart of our
paper. After all, we need to be consistent in our interpretation of statistical
methods if we want a proper assessment of the uncertain prospects we face, and
a sound consequentialist appraisal of our choices.
In the first section of this paper, we analyze a simplified model of ethical
decision-making, showing how consistency in the assignment of probabilities is
a prerequisite for any consequentialist justification of our choices. In the second
section we provide a short introduction to significance testing and its two main
interpretations. In section three we point to inconsistencies in the actual practice
of significance testing. Finally, in section four, we discuss several proposals for
a consistent use of statistical tests in practical decision-making.
1 Ethics and statistics
Long before the establishment of mathematical statistics as a discipline, the eth-
ical dimension of uncertain decisions was appraised in an Aristotelian tradition,
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namely in terms of their prudence (Aubenque 1986): a good choice depended
on finding the correct means for the correct goal. According to Aristotle, there
was no general rule for dealing with ethical choices under uncertainty. Rather,
like ancient medicine, good decision-making as thought of as a craft where one
had to apply one’s practical wisdom (phronêsis). In the same way that we de-
fer to the advice of a medical doctor when we are sick, we should defer to the
practically wise in questions of ethical decision-making. His or her voice settles
disagreement about what we should do. One of the most salient examples in
Greek history was Pericles, the wise manager of the city of Athens in the 5th
century BC.
With Kant, almost two thousand years later, prudential choices are left out of
the proper realm of ethics. The highest ethical good does not consist any more in
achieving a certain goal, but in the good will. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the
Aristotelian deference to experts, Kant developed the categorical imperative as
a universal rule of action: to act in a way that could be generalized to a general
law. This single maxim is to be followed independently of the uncertainty of
the alternatives and the practical consequences they yield. For example, we are
not allowed to lie, even if as a consequence of our truth-telling, a malevolent
dictator will be able to track down innocent refugees. In such an act of lying,
we would use the person that we are lying to as an means to an end, something
that is incompatible with Kant’s vision of human autonomy and dignity.
Evidently, statistical advice is most relevant for those approaches in ethics
that appraise the rightness of our choices in terms of their consequences. Re-
member that for Kant, we are morally compelled to abide by the categorical
imperative: you are not allowed to protect a refugee by lying about her where-
abouts. This emphasis on universal maxims and duties is a deontological ap-
proach. By contrast, a consequentialist in the prudential tradition (cf. Sinnott-
Armstrong 2008) would consider such action wrong, given the likely conse-
quences (the refugee being tortured and/or killed), and would have justified
lying. Here, a statistical analysis can step in, by weighting the likely conse-
quences of our actions against each other: maybe the refugee will be able to
escape despite our collaboration with the regime, so telling the truth might not
be such a bad thing.
Notably, a statistical analysis does not impinge on our goals: these are taken
as given. But if our decision depends on the likelihood of attaining these goals,
a statistical analysis may evaluate the ethical correction of our decision. For
instance, if a hedge fund manager invests her customers money on the basis
of careless calculations, we will consider her morally blameworthy: we need
accurate estimates of the consequences of our investment decisions in order to
justify them. Here arises a source of epistemic and ethical concerns: since the
correction of our choice depends on the correspondence between our models
and the actual risks we are dealing with, how do we know that our model
adequately captures such risks? The gist of Nassim Taleb’s (2007) best seller
The Black Swan is that risks in financial markets (as in other domains) are
often not adequately described: we mistakenly assume that the real risks can
be structured by a simple probabilistic model, such as the Normal distribution.
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Due to the idealizing nature of such assumptions (e.g, the extremely thin tails
of the Normal distribution), we are ill prepared to estimate the real likelihood
of high-impact events.1
The recent financial crisis illustrates that we can rarely apply statistics
blindly, as if we had a mechanical algorithm: statistical analysis depends on
a number of assumptions about the data and the proper way to handle them.
Intuitively, the decision-maker seems to have the responsibility to check those
assumptions. For instance, according to Michael Lewis (2010), there were a
number of traders who anticipated the 2007 crash of the subprime mortgage
market and actually earned significant amounts of money by selling insurance
against it. The standard procedure to redistribute the risk of a mortgage de-
faulting was through a collateralized debt obligation (CDO), a bond in which
thousands of loans were gathered in tranches with different levels of risks, under
the assumption that they would not all default together. According to Lewis, it
took just a simulation of the effects of home price appreciations on these loans to
convince an insightful trader (such as Gregg Lippmann) that default rates would
violate the CDO assumptions: they could very easily collapse simultaneously.
Should we blame the sellers of CDOs for not conducting such simulations?
Before we answe “yes”, we need to be aware of what we may legitimately expect
and require from statistics in order to attribute the responsibility for a proper
or improper use. In particular, such a responsibility cannot be easily attributed,
unless we have a regulative ideal against which to evaluate a particular choice.
The classical regulative ideal in consequentialist decision-making is Subjec-
tive Expected Utility Theory (SEUT), developed by, inter alia, Ramsey (1926)
and Savage (1954). By now, it has become the standard model of decision-
making under uncertainty in social science and in moral and political philoso-
phy. The classical justification proceeds by outlining an intuitive axiom system
for individual preferences, demanding that they be complete, transitive, respect
the sure-thing principle, apply to mixed bundles of goods, and so on. Then,
it is shown that such a system of preferences admits a (unique up to affine
transformation) representation in terms of a real-valued utility function over
the outcomes and a probability function representing the subjective uncertainty
of the agent. That is, if a1, . . . , an denote the available actions, p(·) denotes
our subjective probability function over states s1, . . . , sn, and ukl the utility of
1Frank Knight (1921) famously argued that statistical theory could not be applied to
business decisions. When a businessman is making a choice between uncertain alternatives,
this uncertainty arises from so many particular circumstances that there is no way of telling
if such a decision will ever take place again. For Knight, each choice is entirely unique and
cannot be made part of a class of similar choices arising from a general decision rule. On the
other hand, statistical decision theory is a theory of probabilistic decisions, and at Knight’s
time, probabilities in statistical inference were usually explicated as relative frequencies. We
could estimate how risky a decision rule is analysing how frequently it yields successful choices,
but if each decision is entirely singular, as Knight argued, we cannot quantify the risk: we
are dealing with real uncertainty. Modern financial economics assumes precisely the opposite:
there are precise mathematical models of the risks involved in most of our economic decisions,
and these models allow us to determine which option is best.
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action k in state l, then action ai is better than action aj if and only if
n∑
k=1
p(sk)uik >
n∑
k=1
p(sk)ujk. (1)
In other words, the averaged or expected utility of ai exceeds the expected
utility of aj with respect to one’s subjective probability funtion, hence the name
Subjective Expecte Utility Theory.
As a descriptive model of the average economic agent, SEUT is often con-
tested (Allais 1953; Ellsberg 1961). However, it is often defended on normative
grounds (Jallais et al. 2008). If you are a consequentialist, not taking into ac-
count the principles of probability will put you in a difficult position. Take, for
example, the representation of uncertainty by a probability function – an essen-
tial cornerstone of SEUT. If our degrees of belief violate the axioms of probabil-
ity, a malicious bookie can set up a gamble (according to our degrees of belief)
whose set of odds and bets guarantees a profit for him, whatever the actual
outcome (Vineberg 2011). Since degrees of belief are standardly operational-
ized via betting behavoir or judgments on the fairness of bets, non-probabilistic
degrees of belief are arguably self-defeating.
Still, even if we are convinced by this “Dutch Book Argument” in favor of
coherent probabilities, it has not been demonstrated that we should maximize
the average expected utility. The standard argument to that end goes that in the
long run, acting in accordance with SEUT delivers practical success. In his 1951
essay “Why should statisticians and businessmen maximize moral expectation?”,
Jacob Marschak tried to derive from the rule of maximizing expected utility the
satisfaction of “the rule of long run success”: under certain assumptions, it will
be almost certain that a sequence of strategies maximizing expected utility will
outperform any other consequentialist decision rule (Marschak 1951, 504-505).
Unlike the Dutch book argument, Marschak’s case was about winning, rather
than not losing, appealing to the practical rationality of businessmen. Still,
this argument has, apart from doubts about the plausibility of its assumptions,
often been challenged – particularly by the empirical findings of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979).
Objections put aside for the moment, we see two different consequentialist
justifications for SEUT as a standard of rational and ethical choice. If the
moral correctness of our decisions depends on an accuracy of their consequences,
SEUT contributes to it in two ways. There is, on the one hand, (probabilistic)
coherence: make your choices in a way that it is not self-defeating for your aims.
On the other hand, there is success: make your choices in a way that actually
maximizes your chances of attaining your goals. We will, in the remainder, use
SEUT as a regulative ideal against which we evaluate different approaches to
statistical testing. If we do not apply our statistical techniques consistently,
we cannot expect statistics to increase our chances of success. Hence, from a
consequentialist perspective, we will lack a proper statistical justification of our
decisions. We will be just deceiving ourselves or misleading our audience into
the incorrect belief that we have such a justification.
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2 Two varieties of frequentist statistics
Statistics tries to anticipate random events by drawing on the data that have
accumulated in our experience. We try to discern a pattern in the random
distribution of these data (past, present and future): we form hypotheses about
such distributions and we use statistical tests to check whether our hypotheses
are correct. In its simplest form, a hypothesis test compares two hypotheses H0
and H1 about an unknown quantity of interest, represented by the parameter
θ ∈ Θ. Sometimes we deal with a precise hypothesis about θ, e.g., H0 : θ = θ0
– the null hypothesis – and oppose it to an unspecified alternative H1 : θ 6= θ0.
It is then tested whether the data are compatible with the null, or whether a
significant deviation is present. Such hypothesis testing is the prime activity of
frequentist inference – inference that shuns subjective assessments of uncertainty
and only builds on the probability of events under the tested hypotheses, that
is, the sampling distribution.
There are two main approaches to hypothesis testing within frequentists
statistics. The first one, devised by Jerzy Neyman, argues that statistical testing
is about making decisions about the acceptability of a hypothesis. The second
one, due to Ronald A. Fisher, claims that statistical tests should only provide
an assesment of the evidence for or against a particular scientific claim. Both
interpretations are often confused in practice. Below, we spell out the difference:
conflation of both approaches goes at the expense of conceptual consistency that
we seek in order to make properly informed decisions.
Together with Egon Pearson, Neyman designed a hypothesis test as a proper
decision rule, that is, as a function T : X → {acceptH0, rejectH0}, X being
the sample space. Think, for example, of industrial quality control. Should we
accept a delivery of bulbs which we have sampled for defective elements? The
answer will, inevitably, depend on how many elements in our sample have been
found to be defective. We might make the wrong decision if, by chance, we pick
a nonrepresentative sample, but if the test is properly designed, only a small
number of our decisions will be mistaken.
From an epistemological point of view, the Neyman-Pearson approach re-
ceives its justification by the associated error probabilities. Let the null hy-
pothesis be that in our delivery of bulbs, there are not more than 10% defect
elements, and let the alternative posit that there are more than 10% defect
bulbs. (Assume that 10% is the highest proportion of defect bulbs at which it is
still economically advantageous for us to accept the delivery.) The test statistic
T is then so designed that the null hypothesis is rejected in at most 5% of all
cases where it is true, that is, where the delivery is acceptable.2 This type I
error level – the probability of an erroneous rejection of the null – can also be
chosen to be 10%, or 1%, etc. – the cutoff is purely conventional and reflects
how important we find it that the null is not erroneously rejected.
Evidently, there are various tests that satisfy this property. Trivially, even
a test that always accepts the null (and the delivery of bulbs) will have a type
2Mathematically, this is done by assigning the acceptance region a weight of 0.95, that is´
T=0 P (x)dx = 0.95.
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I error level as low as 0%. While such a test appears desirable in theory, it is
practically unsound: the decision does not depend at all on how many defect
bulbs are found. In other words, the test is not responsive to the strength of
the evidence. Therefore, the acceptance region should be chosen such that,
for a type I error level deemed acceptable, say, 5%, the type II error level – the
probability of an erroneous acceptance of the null – is minimized. We say in that
case that the power of the test, its ability to recognize the alternative when it
is true, is maximized conditional on the level of the test being 5%. In this way,
both possible types of error are controlled, and the optimal Neyman-Pearson
test will rarely lead to a wrong decision:
we shall reject H0 when it true not more, say, than once in a hundred
times, and in addition we may have evidence that we shall reject H0
sufficiently often when it is false. (Neyman and Pearson 1933, 291,
notational details changed)
Such a behavioral rationale is well-suited to inform real decisions with concrete,
immediate impact. Neyman’s approach emerged from the world of industrial
quality control, where every decision has costs and benefits. Statistical tests
à la Neyman were aimed at hedging costs, conforming to the consequentialist
spirit presented in the previous section. But not every statistician shared such
an applied perspective: many “decisions” in science are just preliminary and
subject to further evidence. A behavioral interpretation of statistical testing
was considered inferior to an evidential, inferential interpretation, where we
assess the truth of a hypothesis, independently of the consequences of a wrong
assessment. As R.A. Fisher put it:
In the field of pure research no assessment of the cost of wrong
conclusions [. . . ] can conceivably be more than a pretence, and in
any case such an assessment would be inadmissible and irrelevant in
judging the state of the scientific evidence. (Fisher 1935, 25–26)
Two arguments are implied here. First, we cannot quantify the utility that cor-
rectly accepting or rejecting a hypothesis will eventually have for the advance-
ment of science. The far-reaching consequences of such a decision are beyond
our horizon. Second, statistical hypothesis tests should state the evidence for
or against the tested hypothesis: a scientist is interested in whether she has
reason to believe that a hypothesis is true or false, and her judgment should
not be obscured by the long-term consequences of working with this rather than
that hypothesis. For Fisher, testing an hypothesis requires an assesment of the
significance of the evidence against it. By his emphasis on evidence rather than
decisions, Fisher departs from Neyman and Pearson’s consequentialist reason-
ing – a change that severely affects the interpretation of those statistical testing
procedures.
Significance tests aim at determining whether a perceived effect in the data
is real or possibly due to chance. If the discrepancy between data and null hy-
pothesis is large enough, we are entitled to infer to the presence of a significant
effect. Suppose we have a precise null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 vs. H1 : θ 6= θ0.
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For measuring the discrepancy in the data x := (x1, . . . , xN ) with respect to pos-
tulated mean value θ0 of a population with known variance σ2, one canonically
uses the standardized statistic
z(x) :=
√
N
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi − θ0√
σ2
(2)
Thus, we may re-interpret equation (2) as
z =
observed effect− hypothesized effect
standard error
. (3)
Determining whether a result is significant or not depends then, on the dis-
tribution of the value of z. Practitioners usually use the so-called p-value or
significance level, the “tail area” of the null under the observed data (see figure
1), which can be computed as
p := P (|z(X)| ≥ |z(x)|) (4)
that is, as the probability of observing a more extreme discrepancy under the
null than the one which is actually observed. On that reading, a low significance
level indicates evidence against the null since the chance that z would take
a value at least as high as z(x) is very small, if the null were indeed true.
Conventionally, one says that p < 0.05 means significant evidence against the
null, p < 0.01 very significant evidence, etc. To repeat, p-values serve, in the
first place, the purpose of statistical inference, not the purpose of statistically
informed decision-making.
Fisher has interpreted significance levels as “a measure of the rational grounds
for the disbelief [in the null hypothesis] it augments” (Fisher 1956, 43). What
is more, Fisher is explicit that some cutoff value for p should be regarded as
necessary for speaking about the presence of a scientifically significant effect:
Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at
the 5 per cent point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to reach
this level. A scientific fact should be regarded as experimentally
established only if a properly designed experiment rarely fails to
give this level of significance. (Fisher 1935, 504)
The possibility of integrating these two approaches to statistical inference into
a consequentialist framework are remarkably different. Neyman incorporates
an explicit consequentialist dimension: we can justify the acceptance of a hy-
pothesis in terms of the balance between the number of successes and failures
we will obtain if we consistently apply our decision rule. If we are willing to
bear a mistaken decision about hypothesis in 5 out of every 100 tests, an ap-
propriate hypothesis test provides the statistical tools to ensure this error rate
in the long run. In this way, frequentist statistics can be naturally integrated
into reponsible decision-making.
However, the majority of inferences and decisions in science and business
are derived from observed significance levels, in line with Fisher’s evidential ap-
proach. Indeed, Fisher’s above quote demonstrates that the borderline between
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Figure 1: The rejection region for testing the mean of a N(0,1)-distributed
random variable at the 5% level.
evidence and practical decisions is thin (“ignore entirely all results which fail to
reach this [significance] level”). Significance tests do not quantify how often will
we suceed or fail if we apply such rules, and leave ample room for interpreta-
tion when we try to apply them in practice. As a consequence, they are often
misused, without no clear way to attribute responsibility for the failures. The
next section illuminates those criticisms in detail.
3 Misuses of significance testing
As mentioned above, significance tests are, although devised as procedures for
stating the evidence against the null, frequently used for substantiating practical
decisions, e.g., the null is either accepted or rejected depending on the strength
of the evidence. Is this practice compatible with the regulative ideal of SEUT?
Do significance tests give a valid assessment of our uncertainty about the tested
hypothesis?
Concretely, we have to ask whether p-values can be meaningfully related
to subjective posterior probabilities (that is, probabilities conditional on the
observed evidence) that enter the expected utility analysis. While a subjective
analysis is often charged with being arbitrary, it cannot be doubted that in
some cases, e.g., when reasoning in games of chance, subjective probability
assignments can be objectively grounded. In these canonical cases, p-values
should give a valid cue about subjective posterior probabilities.
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However, the analyses of Berger and Delampady (1987) and Berger and
Sellke (1987) have shown that p-values tend to grossly overstate evidence against
the null, to the extent that the posterior probability of the null – and even the
minimum of p(H0|x) under a large class of prior uncertainty assessments –
is typically much higher than the observed p-value. In other words, even a
subjectivist analysis that is maximally biased against the null is still less biased
than a p-value analysis. This has led statisticians to state that “almost anything
will give a better indication of the evidence provided by the data against H0”
(Berger and Delampady 1987, 330). The main source of the problem is that
p-values do not make use of the full information contained in the data – namely
that the observed discrepancy is equal to z – but only of the information that
the discrepancy is greater or equal to z, cf. equation (4).
The situation is further complicated if we focus on the justification for using
(4) as a statistic that measures the strength of the evidence against the null.
Fisher famously argued that a low p-value, that is, a highly significant finding,
means that “either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred, or the theory
[=the null hypothesis] is not true” (Fisher 1956, 39). That is, in the face of
surprising results, we make an inference to the best explanation, namely to
the falsity of the null. On a superficial glance, this inference rule provides a
natural implementation of Popper’s critical rationalist attitude into statistical
reasoning. According to that school of philosophy, scientific method consists in
the successive testing and refutation of conjectures one comes up with. However,
the analogy is superficial. Fisher’s Disjunction can be rephrased as the inference
p(Data|Null Hypothesis) is low.
Data is observed.
Null Hypothesis must be false.
Many arguments and counterexamples have been raised in order to show that
this probabilistic modus tollens is invalid (Hacking 1965; Cohen 1994). First of
all, what is valid in deductive logic need not be valid in probabilistic logic. Sec-
ond, only with respect to a well-specified set of alternatives we can meaningfully
say that a certain set of data constitute evidence against a hypothesis. The idea
of testing a hypothesis “in isolation”, without consideration of alternatives, has
proved to be incoherent (Edwards, Lindman and Savage 1963; Spielman 1974;
Royall 1997). In other words, even for purely evidential purposes, we should
not use significance testing without a very careful consideration of the way we
frame a hypothesis and the alternatives.
In actual practice such caution in the use and interpretation of signficance
testing is often missing. In economics, for instance, the economists Deirdre
McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak have launched strong attacks against significance
tests in a series of papers and books (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, 2008; Ziliak
and McCloskey 2004, 2008). Let us give their favorite example.
Assume that we have to choose between two diet cures, based on pill A and
pill B. Pill A has an average effect of making you lose 10 pounds, with an an
average variation of 5 pounds.3 Pill B will make you lose 3 pounds on average,
3The concept of “average variation” is intuitively explicated as the statistical concept of
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with an average variation of 1 pound. Which one leads to more significant loss?
Naturally, we opt for pill A, in spite of the higher variation, because the effect
size is so much larger.
However, if we translate the example back into significance testing and iden-
tify the null hypothesis with the default claim that there is no effect at all, the
order is reversed. Observing a three pounds weight loss after taking pill B, with
a known standard error of one pound, is stronger evidence for the efficacy of
B than observing a ten pounds weight loss after taking pill A, with a known
standard error of five pounds, is evidence for the efficacy of B:
zA(10) =
10− 0
5
= 2 zB(3) =
3− 0
1
= 3
Thus, there is a notable discrepancy between our intuitive judgment about which
pill is effective in making a patient lose weight. This occurs because statistical
significance is supposed to be “a measure of the strength of the signal relative
to background noise” (Hoover and Siegler 2008b, 58). On this score, pill B
indeed performs better than pill A, and reasonably so because there is quite
some noise in the effects of pill A. But what really matters, what economists,
businesswomen and policy-makers are interested in, is the effect size, not the
signal strength/noise ratio captured by significance tests, argue McCloskey and
Ziliak. We are not interested in whether we can ascertain the presence of some
effect, but whether we can demonstrate a substantial effect. In other words, we
have to state in which currency we measure effects, and what a deviance of one,
two, or three standard errors actually means for the intended application.
According to McCloskey and Ziliak, economists and other social scientists
frequently commit the fallacy of neglecting this fundamental difference. By scru-
tinizing the statistical practice in the top journal American Economic Review,
as well as by surveying the opinion of economists on the meaning of statistical
significance, they arrive at the conclusion that most economists are unaware of
the proper meaning of statistical concepts.4 In practice, “asterisking” prevails:
e.g., in correlation tables, the most significant results are marked with an aster-
isk, and these results are the ones that are supposed to be real, big, of economic
importance. Whereas the other correlations are neglected. This neglects two
salient pitfalls: first, an effect need not be statistically significant to be big and
remarkable (like pill A), second, a statistically significant effect can be quite
small and uninteresting (like pill B).
Even more disconcerting is that according to empirical surveys, many prac-
titioners believe that if a result speaks highly significantly against the null, then
it must be wrong (Oakes 1986). In other words, the null is believed to be highly
improbable if a highly significant result is observed. But posterior probabilities
of the null hypothesis don’t have a place in the frequentist inference framework
that we have assumed so far. Even if that particular fallacy is avoided, confla-
tion often reigns: p-values are often perceived as the probability of replicating
standard deviance: for a random variable X, we calculate
p
E[(X − E(X))2].
4Their results are disputed by Hoover and Siegler (2008a) and Spanos (2008), but reaffirmed
in McCloskey and Ziliak (2008). It is fair to say that the discussion of this point is still open.
See also Zellner (2004).
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an effect of at least the same size, as the level of type I error, etc. None of these
standpoints are statistically valid.5
A main danger of conducting significance tests is thus that misinterpreta-
tion is so prolific, distorting the results. Methodologists such as Fidler (2005)
and Cumming and Finch (2005) have therefore suggested to drop significance
tests altogether and to report confidence intervals for the parameter of inter-
est instead. Taken together with the more theoretical criticisms of significance
tests, it seems that the practice of basing business and science decisions on sta-
tistical data is often far from the ideal of ethically responsible and prudential
decision-making.
4 Discussion
Our analysis has revealed that despite their apparent simplicity, significance
tests are difficult to interpret and to practically use in a consistent manner.
From a consequentialist perspective, we should not value much decisions that
are grounded on misinterpreted significance tests. If our hedge-fund manager
had made an investment on the basis of any such test, we may consider him
morally blameworthy, but if the confusion is so widespread (as the CDO case
seems to point out) no court will declare him guilty.
Therefore, it is not only an epistemological, but also an ethical requirement
to publicly agree on standards for consistent statistical practices. As for sig-
nificance testing, there is much room for improvement. We briefly sketch three
possible options within the frequentist paradigm, none of them being entirely
unproblematic.
1. Keep significance tests, but interpret them properly, e.g., by including
effect size and power measures. This proposal by Hoover and Siegler
(2008a,b) accepts that failure to distinguish between significance level and
effect size is a fallacy, but argues that significance testing does have an im-
portant function in science and particularly economics: namely to decide
whether the error in a statistical model can be regarded as truly random,
or whether a systematic bias is present. To our mind, however, pure sig-
nificance testing without considering explicit alternatives has trouble to
be embedded into a coherent logic of inference.
2. Move to confidence intervals. A solution that has become increasingly
popular in psychology and that has, in the meantime, reached out to edi-
torial policies (Wilkinson et al. 1999). Confidence intervals replace signif-
icance level by providing 95%/99%/etc. coverage areas for the data, given
a particular value of the parameter of interest. It has been argued (Cum-
ming 2008) that they are a much better indicator of effect replication than
5Even sophisticated defenders of significance testing in economics, such as Hoover and
Siegler (2008b, 58), sometimes go wrong, e.g., when they call a significance level a “type
I error probability”. To recall, error probabilities are pre-experimental characteristic of a
decision procedures, significance levels are measures of discrepancy between data and null.
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significance levels, and that they are more stable for the purpose of meta-
analysis. However, these intervals must not be interpreted as credible in-
tervals in the sense that with 95% probability, the parameter is contained
in the confidence interval. If scientists already have trouble to distinguish
between p-values and posterior probabilities, they may be equally likely to
commit the natural fallacy of interpreting confidence intervals along the
lines of degrees of belief about the location of the parameter value.
3. Retract to Neyman’s behavioral interpretation of statistical tests. That is,
statistical tests are not used for finding out whether a hypothesis is right
or wrong, but only for supporting a particular decision. This proposal
has never found many supporters in practice. One of the most salient
reasons is that any statistical analysis would then be highly idiosyncratic,
dependent on the interests and the particular loss function of the individ-
ual that conducts the analysis. Intersubjective communication of results
and conclusions would, as a consequence, suffer. Moreover, the technical
problems – how to compute the level and the power of more complicated
testing problems, how to avoid the slippery slope to a subjectivist frame-
work – are far from trivial. – An intermediate position between Neyman
and Fisher is advocated by Mayo and Spanos (2006) under the label of
error statistics.
A radically different solution goes back to the grounding of decisions and
tests in SEUT. The idea is to conceive of statistical inference as providing the
relevant probabilities for what might or might not be the case, and to feed these
probabilities into an expected utility analysis. That is, we inform good decisions
by means of well-calibrating our assessments of uncertainty. The standard way
of doing so is via Bayesian Conditionalization. If we are revising our degree of
belief in hypothesis H in the light of evidence E, our new degree of belief in H
can be computed as
pnew(H) := p(H|E) = p(H)p(E|H)
p(E)
. (5)
Statistical analysis can thus inform right decisions in the following way: we
start with a prior probability function p(·) that represents our initial uncer-
tainty, revise it in the light of statistical evidence E by equation (5), and apply
the principle of maximizing expected utility with our new posterior probability
function p(·|E).
This subjective understanding of statistical inference is called Bayesian in-
ference. It dominates in moral and political theory, decision theory and game
theory. One of its big advantages is its coherence, simplicity and universality:
it is by construction in sync with SEUT. Moreover, while complex applications
demand mathematical sophistication, the basic conceptual framework of equa-
tion 5 remains unscathed. Finally, the epistemic and the ethical/utility-related
aspects of the analysis are separated from each other (an advantage vis-à-vis
Neyman’s approach), and the probabilistic assessment precedes and serves as
an input for the actual decision-making.
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However, many scientists – in particular those coming from the natural sci-
ences – have problems with the subjective interpretation of probability, or con-
sider it unsuitable for scientific analysis. According to that view, science should
deal with objective facts, objective evidence, not with revising subjective (and
ultimately arbitrary) degrees of belief. A fortiori, scientific inference must not
proceed by Bayesian Conditionalization. The main attraction of the frequentist
paradigm is, to repeat, that it eschews degrees of beliefs, builds on the view of
probability as relative frequency and devises statistical methods that fit these
parsimonious modeling assumptions. But in the light of the problems that the
most popular frequentist testing procedures experience, the Bayesian paradigm
may deserve more attention. Indeed, recent developments in statistical method-
ology support a trend towards increased use of Bayesian methods.
Thus, a responsible decision-maker needs to think carefully about statistical
methodology: too much can depend on choosing an adequate or inadequate
interpretation of a statistical test. We believe that striving for ethically sound
decisions does not commit oneself to Bayesianism or frequentism; however, the
frequentist stance may be loaded with more challenges and pitfalls with respect
to applying it consistently.
References
Allais, Maurice (1953): “Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le
risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école Américaine”, Econometrica
21, 503–546.
Aubenque, Pierre (1986): La prudence chez Aristote. Paris: Presses universi-
taires de France.
Berger, James O., and Mohan Delampady (1987): “Testing Precise Hypotheses
(with discussion)”, Statistical Science 2, 317–352.
Berger, James O., and Thomas Sellke (1987): “Testing a point null hypothesis:
The irreconciliability of P-values and evidence (with discussion)”, Journal of
the American Statistical Association 82, 112–139.
Cohen, Jacob (1994): “The Earth is Round (p < .05)”, American Psychologist
49, 997–1001.
Cumming, Geoff, and S. Finch (2005): “Inference by eye: Confidence intervals,
and how to read pictures of data”, American Psychologist 60, 170–180.
Cumming, Geoff (2008): “Replication and p intervals: p values predict the
future only vaguely, but confidence intervals do much better”, Perspectives on
Psychological Science 3, 286–300.
Edwards, Ward, Harold Lindman and Leonard J. Savage (1963): “Bayesian
Statistical Inference for Psychological Research”, Psychological Review 70,
450–499.
13
Ellsberg, Daniel (1961): “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 75 , 643–669.
Fidler, Fiona (2005): From Statistical Significance to Effect Estimation. Ph.D.
Thesis: University of Melbourne.
Fisher, Ronald A. (1926): “Arrangement of Field Experiments”, Journal of
Ministry of Agriculture XXXIII, 503–513.
Fisher, Ronald A. (1935): The Design of Experiments. Edinburgh: Oliver and
Boyd.
Fisher, Ronald A. (1956): Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. New
York: Hafner.
Hacking, Ian (1965): Logic of Statistical Inference. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Hoover, Kevin D., and Mark V. Siegler (2008a): “Sound and Fury: McCloskey
and Significance Testing in Economics”, Journal of Economic Methodology 15,
1–37.
Hoover, Kevin D., and Mark V. Siegler (2008b): “The rhetoric of ‘Signifying
nothing’: a rejoinder to Ziliak and McCloskey”, Journal of Economic Method-
ology 15, 57–68.
Jallais, S., P. Ch. Pradier, and D. Teira (2008): “Facts, Norms and Expected
Utility Functions”, History of the Human Sciences 21, 45–62.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision under Risk”, Econometrica 47, 263–291.
Knight, Frank (1921): Risk, uncertainty and profit. Boston/New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company.
Lewis, Michael (2010): The big short: inside the doomsday machine. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Marschak, J. (1951): “Why Should Statisticians and Businessmen Maximize
Moral Expectation?”, in: Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, 493–506. Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press.
Mayo, Deborah G., and Aris Spanos (2006): “Severe Testing as a Basic Concept
in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Induction”, The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 57, 323–357.
McCloskey, Deirdre N., and Stephan T. Ziliak (1996): “The Standard Error of
Regressions”, Journal of Economic Literature 34, 97–114.
McCloskey, Deirdre N., and Stephan T. Ziliak (2008): “Signifying Nothing:
Reply to Hoover and Siegler”, Journal of Economic Methodology 15, 39–55.
14
Neyman, Jerzy, and Egon Pearson (1933): “On the problem of the most effi-
cient tests of statistical hypotheses”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society A 231, 289–337.
Oakes, M. (1986): Statistical inference: A commentary for the social and be-
havioral sciences. New York: Wiley.
Ramsey, Frank P. (1926/1990): “Truth and Probability”, in: Philosophical
Papers (eds.), D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Royall, Richard (1997): Scientific Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm. London:
Chapman & Hall.
Savage, Leonard J. (1954): Foundations of Statistics. Dover: New York.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2008): “Consequentialism”, in: The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (eds.), Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fall2008/entries/consequentialism/, retrieved on July
18, 2011..
Spielman, Stephen (1974): “On the Infirmities of Gillies’s Rule”, British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 25, 261–265.
Taleb, Nassim (2007): The black swan: the impact of the highly improbable. New
York: Random House.
Vineberg, Susan (2011): “Dutch Book Arguments”, in: The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (eds.), Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2008/entries/dutch-book/, retrieved on July 18, 2011..
Wilkinson, L., and Task Force on Statistical Inference (1999): “Statistical Meth-
ods in Psychology Journals”, American Psychologist 54, 594–604.
Zellner, Arnold (2004): “To Test or Not to Test and If So, How?”, Journal of
Socio-Economics 33, 581–586.
Ziliak, Stephen T., and Deirdre N. McCloskey (2004): “Size Matters: The Stan-
dard Error of Regressions in the American Economic Review ”, Journal of
Socio-Economics 33, 527–546.
Ziliak, Stephen T., and Deirdre N. McCloskey (2008): The Cult of Statistical
Significance: How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice and Lives. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
15
